The Cyprus Question
For centuries, tensions between the Greek and Turkish inhabitants of the small island of Cyprus have oscillated between openly violent at some times to collaboratively civil at others. (Yilmaz 38) Although the balance rests at a relatively peaceful level at the moment, a public problem has persisted since Britain gave Cyprus independence in the autumn of 1960: How are the ethnic Turks and Greeks to be fairly represented by the Republic of Cyprus?
In the decades since gaining independence, demography politics has been a point of contention for a few major international deals. One such deal is Turkey's potential acceptance into the European Union as a member-state, since Turkey's policies regarding trade with Cyprus are linked to the open-endedness of the so-called “Cyprus question.” In addition to the EU and Turkey, the United States of America and the United Nations have tried to assist the island republic in pulling its people together. As of yet, no settlement has been reached.
Although Cyprus' historic roots are intertwined in the actions and machinations of foreign states, those external actors are losing their influence. A new generation of Cypriots, particularly of Turkish ethnicity, are identifying themselves as citizens of Cyprus instead of expatriated people of a foreign state. (Bahcheli and Noel 145) As much as outside forces have molded Cyprus into its current state, the republic itself must become the primary actor in deciding the future of its peoples.
The Greek-Cypriot population has been the ethnic majority in the republic since independence was brokered between Cyprus, its colonial master Britain, and its dual guarantor states Greece and Turkey on August 16th, 1960. The majority in the population was reflected in the government, since the Greek Cypriots controlled seventy percent of the new state's apparatus. The Turkish Cypriots, who composed one-fifth of the population compared to the Greeks' three-fourths, were constitutionally mandated the remaining thirty-percent share of government control. This arrangement only served to increase tensions between a Greek populace who thought the minority had a disproportionate amount of political power and a Turkish populace who saw the majority as all too willing to unify the state with Greece. (Yilmaz 45-7)
Three years after achieving statehood, ethnic violence resumed with rare fervor. In 1963, President Archbishop Makarios III proposed legislation that would effectively undo the most crucial boons to Turkish-Cypriot representation. (Moore 30) By 1964, Turkish Cypriots were so abandoned and abused by the Greek-Cypriot majority that UN peacekeepers had to intervene across the island in effort to quell the unrest. (Morelli 1; Yalnitz 48) Despite this intervention, the Turkish Cypriots still saw their property and territorial holdings dwindle from thirty-five percent of the island to a mere five percent of the island by 1974. (Bahcheli and Noel 140; Yilmaz 48) Shortly after that round of violence, the Turkish Cypriots, under-served and marginalized, withdrew most of their guaranteed representatives from official republic duty in order to attend to the minority group's affairs. (Morelli 1)
Intercommunal tensions reached their peak in the summer of 1974. Radical Greek Cypriots, aided by the military-run state of Greece, successfully ejected Archbishop Makarios III from the presidency. As the archbishop fled to London, radicals of both Cypriot ethnic groups saw enosis, or Cyprus' union with mainland Greece, close to fruition. Turkey retaliated by launching an invasion of Cyprus that same July in order to preserve its national interest. The Turks landed in the northern section of the island, where most of their ethnic kin were settled, and proceeded to reclaim around thirty-eight percent of the island in little more than a month's time. The invading forces ended their attack at what would become known as “the Green Zone,” a United Nations buffer territory that divided the Republic of Cyprus into the Greek-Cypriot-controlled south and the Turkish-Cypriot-controlled north. The citizens shuffled as quickly across the Green Zone as they could to ensure residence in the designated ethnic region. (Moore 30-1; Morelli 1; Yilmaz 49)
Since the partition occurred in 1974, tensions have cooled considerably between the two regions of Cyprus. Resentment remains, however, among the leadership as well as the citizenry. The politics of this resentment was particularly dynamic in the northern region of Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots struggled with each other to become the primary political party to determine the region's future. From its first formal elections in 1975, the northern Cypriots have seen power bounce from party to coalition of parties in bouts where on-the-ground social and economic issues squared off with more cerebral questions of national identity and solidarity. Even the declaration of itself as the autonomous Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 was not met with universal approval among Turkish Cypriots, many of whom vocally supported reconciliation with the southern territory. (Bahcheli and Noel 141-2) As of 2013, only the state of Turkey formally recognizes the TRNC as a separate legal entity from the Republic of Cyprus.
At this point, a hard solution to the Cyprus solution begins to emerges. Not only has the ethnic minority effectively declared independence in a geographically contiguous region, but the government it had set up for itself is a functional democracy that continues to thrive. That government provides for the basic needs of its people in a way that the previous, united government failed; it also pursues political and economic goals in an inclusive, democratic way. All that being acknowledged, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is still, from an international legal standpoint, governed by the Republic of Cyprus, no matter how perfunctory or even unwilling the administration.
The European Union's entrance into Cypriot politics was meant to be a unifying factor for the island when the Greek Cypriots applied for membership in 1990. Indeed, peace talks between northern and southern Cyprus renewed with fervor when both ethnic communities returned to UN-led negotiations. The leaders of both sides investigated and negotiated the options for more than a decade as the EU evaluated Cyprus' application. As May 1, 2004, the date of Cyprus' entry into the EU, approached, proponents of reunification laid their hopes in an island-wide referendum on the Annan Plan, named after then-Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan. The Plan was a tentative, comprehensive agreement that would have united the Cyprus republics into a single, internationally recognized entity with internally dual sovereignty. Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan with a 64.9% vote; however, the Greek Cypriots voted the plan down with a 75.83% disapproval rating. (Buhari-Gulmez 84; Chislett; Morelli 2-3)
The Annan plan failed to take effect, and Cyprus remains divided. Regardless of this political disunity, the European Union granted Cyprus full membership on the projected date. With the TRNC's statehood in existential question, however, it has remained underserved by most EU policies. (Morelli 3) This regional exclusion has created a major stumbling block for Turkey as it attempts entry into the EU. Shortly before it gained clearance for membership consideration, Turkey and the EU entered a trade agreement which granted the former customs union access to all of the EU's member states. When an addendum came up in 2005 to include the ten new EU states, Turkey consented to the extension with a caveat that it would refuse diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, thus expressing solidarity with the TRNC. This refusal to deal with an EU member-state is chief among the list of reasons that the membership path is currently stalled for Turkey; the Turks are well aware of this obstruction, as they have announced that they will continue to withhold diplomatic relations, especially any customs unions, until the dual nations of Cyprus are satisfactorily unified. (Buhari-Gulmez 85; Morelli and Migdalovitz 233-4)
Despite its contentious status, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not quite considered a rogue nation on the world stage. Although the EU kept the TRNC out of its membership (Morelli 3), it nevertheless followed a United Nations recommendation to donate 259 million euros to the nation in order to spur economic development. Turkey continues to provide defense support and diplomatic relations on the TRNC's behalf, although the Republic of Cyprus has called for that relationship to be dissolved as a condition for reunification. (Buhari-Gulmez 84; Morelli and Magdalovitz 231) Negotiations between all these parties continued, with varying senses of urgency, into the spring of 2012, when Cyprus entered the rotating presidency of the EU, thereby putting all talks of the matter on hold. Despite a Greek-Cypriot election and informal meetings and announcements among leaders of both communities, reunification talks between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots have not resumed. (Morelli 12-17)
The international consensus points to the idea that Cyprus is worth reunifying; the unwillingness of both sides to create such a positive consensus among their own communities, however, as well as the leaders' inability to settle on even the most tentative of bargains, (Morelli 3, 4, 7, 13) suggests that reunification will only become harder as time passes. Leaders beyond the island are showing frustration with the island nation's intransigence, as well: UN Special Envoy for the Cyprus situation, Alexander Downer, called the months leading up to Cyprus' rotation into the EU Presidency the “worst three months since [the settlement] process began” (Morelli 9); UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon expressed disappointment “to see a steady stream of... negative remarks,” particularly in the Greek-Cypriot press, regarding the United Nations and its role in the Cyprus negotiations, suggesting that “to undermine UN credibility directly undermine[s] the process itself.” (Chislett)
Debates of land, logistics, and governance are not the only barriers to reunification. Decades of violence may have rendered the two Cypriot communities unable to psychologically consider a partnership, according to one scholar. (Yilmaz 52) Further, generations of Cypriots are growing up with neither a connection to the opposite side of the island and its people nor the desire to forge one with them. (Morelli 21) In the end, a peaceful, formal division into two sovereign states, the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, may be the best solution to the Cyprus problem.
Infrastructures for separate standing states already exist; the original republic still stands, although it is now under total Greek-Cypriot control, and the splinter state has been functioning under a stable democracy for nearly forty years in a way that the official government had been unable and unwilling to do. The complication arises in how the TRNC wants its sovereignty recognized internationally, whereas the RoC considers the northern region Cypriot land under foreign Turkish occupation. (Morelli 23) Considering the island's history regarding majority-minority relations, as well as Turkey's claim of guarantor over its ethnic kin, the Turkish Cypriots may have a substantial claim for separation. Greek-Cypriot opposition to a united island, in the polls and apparently among the leaders, indicates the majority's ambivalence toward the TRNC's secession. (Oguzlu 78)
Like even the most amicable divorces, however, property and border rights must be managed. Plans and procedures have already been proposed; although such agreements have not been solidified between the Cypriots on these matters, they had been tied to minority representation in a federal government; the elimination of such a condition would give fresh context for talk resumption. 50,000 Turkish Cypriots, and three times as many Greek Cypriots, fled into their respective communal regions after the 1974 invasion, and large plots of land were left unoccupied. (Morelli 18) To settle this dispute without fabricating homelessness or generating ethnic resentment, current tenants should be allowed to remain in their homes and not have to vacate for decades-previous residents. Instead, Cypriots would apply for reparations from the government where their former buildings reside and, when approved, the base reward would be the price of the property, adjusted for inflation; greater rewards would be given on a case-by-case basis. The United Nations has already set aside plans to raise “adequate compensation” (Morelli 18) should such an agreement be reached.
Were both of the nations to solidify into sovereign states, the Green Zone would have to be strengthened as a joint state boundary. While travel through the Zone is not heavily restricted by UN forces, the TRNC and the RoC will have to agree on certain procedures for border-crossing, even if only to agree that the UN's protocol will suffice. Both nations have a national guard at their disposal, although the TRNC's official numbers are unknown, so the states will be obligated to patrol and control the shared border. (CIA) UN peacekeepers would remain for a short period of time to transition full control of the border to the Cypriots, although that time frame will be negotiable between the states. The peacekeepers would be especially concentrated in areas along the border that, in the course of negotiations, may change from one state's control to the other; minor territorial disputes are to be expected, as at least one city has been divided by the current boundary.
Perhaps the most contentious point of discussion will be Turkey's continued presence on the island. The Greek Cypriots have called for the immediate total withdrawal of Turkey's troops, a move that the Turkish Cypriots believe would leave the TRNC vulnerable. A more tenable solution would be for Turkey to roll its forces out of the north at a pace that matches the progress in its negotiations with the European Union; as Turkey gets closer to joining, it takes more troops out of the TRNC. For the Turkish-Cypriots' peace of mind, no fewer than one Turkish soldier per three TRNC soldiers will occupy the northern part of the island until Turkey achieves EU membership. Under the 1960 agreement, however, Turkey will still retain its guarantor status. Perhaps, even as statehood negotiations continue, the TRNC can apply for its own place in the EU; after all, one of the easiest deterrents to war is economic partnership, and if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could not be admitted to the EU and its trade union under Cyprus, it could certainly try again as an equal state.
The creation of separate Cypriot states is more than a continuation of the status quo; it would be the affirmation of the Turkish Cypriots' struggles and the cleaning of a diplomatic stain gained in a coup for the Greek Cypriots. It would mean a new beginning for both nations that could perhaps lead to a true, standing peace between them.
In the decades since gaining independence, demography politics has been a point of contention for a few major international deals. One such deal is Turkey's potential acceptance into the European Union as a member-state, since Turkey's policies regarding trade with Cyprus are linked to the open-endedness of the so-called “Cyprus question.” In addition to the EU and Turkey, the United States of America and the United Nations have tried to assist the island republic in pulling its people together. As of yet, no settlement has been reached.
Although Cyprus' historic roots are intertwined in the actions and machinations of foreign states, those external actors are losing their influence. A new generation of Cypriots, particularly of Turkish ethnicity, are identifying themselves as citizens of Cyprus instead of expatriated people of a foreign state. (Bahcheli and Noel 145) As much as outside forces have molded Cyprus into its current state, the republic itself must become the primary actor in deciding the future of its peoples.
The Greek-Cypriot population has been the ethnic majority in the republic since independence was brokered between Cyprus, its colonial master Britain, and its dual guarantor states Greece and Turkey on August 16th, 1960. The majority in the population was reflected in the government, since the Greek Cypriots controlled seventy percent of the new state's apparatus. The Turkish Cypriots, who composed one-fifth of the population compared to the Greeks' three-fourths, were constitutionally mandated the remaining thirty-percent share of government control. This arrangement only served to increase tensions between a Greek populace who thought the minority had a disproportionate amount of political power and a Turkish populace who saw the majority as all too willing to unify the state with Greece. (Yilmaz 45-7)
Three years after achieving statehood, ethnic violence resumed with rare fervor. In 1963, President Archbishop Makarios III proposed legislation that would effectively undo the most crucial boons to Turkish-Cypriot representation. (Moore 30) By 1964, Turkish Cypriots were so abandoned and abused by the Greek-Cypriot majority that UN peacekeepers had to intervene across the island in effort to quell the unrest. (Morelli 1; Yalnitz 48) Despite this intervention, the Turkish Cypriots still saw their property and territorial holdings dwindle from thirty-five percent of the island to a mere five percent of the island by 1974. (Bahcheli and Noel 140; Yilmaz 48) Shortly after that round of violence, the Turkish Cypriots, under-served and marginalized, withdrew most of their guaranteed representatives from official republic duty in order to attend to the minority group's affairs. (Morelli 1)
Intercommunal tensions reached their peak in the summer of 1974. Radical Greek Cypriots, aided by the military-run state of Greece, successfully ejected Archbishop Makarios III from the presidency. As the archbishop fled to London, radicals of both Cypriot ethnic groups saw enosis, or Cyprus' union with mainland Greece, close to fruition. Turkey retaliated by launching an invasion of Cyprus that same July in order to preserve its national interest. The Turks landed in the northern section of the island, where most of their ethnic kin were settled, and proceeded to reclaim around thirty-eight percent of the island in little more than a month's time. The invading forces ended their attack at what would become known as “the Green Zone,” a United Nations buffer territory that divided the Republic of Cyprus into the Greek-Cypriot-controlled south and the Turkish-Cypriot-controlled north. The citizens shuffled as quickly across the Green Zone as they could to ensure residence in the designated ethnic region. (Moore 30-1; Morelli 1; Yilmaz 49)
Since the partition occurred in 1974, tensions have cooled considerably between the two regions of Cyprus. Resentment remains, however, among the leadership as well as the citizenry. The politics of this resentment was particularly dynamic in the northern region of Cyprus, where the Turkish Cypriots struggled with each other to become the primary political party to determine the region's future. From its first formal elections in 1975, the northern Cypriots have seen power bounce from party to coalition of parties in bouts where on-the-ground social and economic issues squared off with more cerebral questions of national identity and solidarity. Even the declaration of itself as the autonomous Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 1983 was not met with universal approval among Turkish Cypriots, many of whom vocally supported reconciliation with the southern territory. (Bahcheli and Noel 141-2) As of 2013, only the state of Turkey formally recognizes the TRNC as a separate legal entity from the Republic of Cyprus.
At this point, a hard solution to the Cyprus solution begins to emerges. Not only has the ethnic minority effectively declared independence in a geographically contiguous region, but the government it had set up for itself is a functional democracy that continues to thrive. That government provides for the basic needs of its people in a way that the previous, united government failed; it also pursues political and economic goals in an inclusive, democratic way. All that being acknowledged, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is still, from an international legal standpoint, governed by the Republic of Cyprus, no matter how perfunctory or even unwilling the administration.
The European Union's entrance into Cypriot politics was meant to be a unifying factor for the island when the Greek Cypriots applied for membership in 1990. Indeed, peace talks between northern and southern Cyprus renewed with fervor when both ethnic communities returned to UN-led negotiations. The leaders of both sides investigated and negotiated the options for more than a decade as the EU evaluated Cyprus' application. As May 1, 2004, the date of Cyprus' entry into the EU, approached, proponents of reunification laid their hopes in an island-wide referendum on the Annan Plan, named after then-Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan. The Plan was a tentative, comprehensive agreement that would have united the Cyprus republics into a single, internationally recognized entity with internally dual sovereignty. Turkish Cypriots approved the Plan with a 64.9% vote; however, the Greek Cypriots voted the plan down with a 75.83% disapproval rating. (Buhari-Gulmez 84; Chislett; Morelli 2-3)
The Annan plan failed to take effect, and Cyprus remains divided. Regardless of this political disunity, the European Union granted Cyprus full membership on the projected date. With the TRNC's statehood in existential question, however, it has remained underserved by most EU policies. (Morelli 3) This regional exclusion has created a major stumbling block for Turkey as it attempts entry into the EU. Shortly before it gained clearance for membership consideration, Turkey and the EU entered a trade agreement which granted the former customs union access to all of the EU's member states. When an addendum came up in 2005 to include the ten new EU states, Turkey consented to the extension with a caveat that it would refuse diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Cyprus, thus expressing solidarity with the TRNC. This refusal to deal with an EU member-state is chief among the list of reasons that the membership path is currently stalled for Turkey; the Turks are well aware of this obstruction, as they have announced that they will continue to withhold diplomatic relations, especially any customs unions, until the dual nations of Cyprus are satisfactorily unified. (Buhari-Gulmez 85; Morelli and Migdalovitz 233-4)
Despite its contentious status, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not quite considered a rogue nation on the world stage. Although the EU kept the TRNC out of its membership (Morelli 3), it nevertheless followed a United Nations recommendation to donate 259 million euros to the nation in order to spur economic development. Turkey continues to provide defense support and diplomatic relations on the TRNC's behalf, although the Republic of Cyprus has called for that relationship to be dissolved as a condition for reunification. (Buhari-Gulmez 84; Morelli and Magdalovitz 231) Negotiations between all these parties continued, with varying senses of urgency, into the spring of 2012, when Cyprus entered the rotating presidency of the EU, thereby putting all talks of the matter on hold. Despite a Greek-Cypriot election and informal meetings and announcements among leaders of both communities, reunification talks between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots have not resumed. (Morelli 12-17)
The international consensus points to the idea that Cyprus is worth reunifying; the unwillingness of both sides to create such a positive consensus among their own communities, however, as well as the leaders' inability to settle on even the most tentative of bargains, (Morelli 3, 4, 7, 13) suggests that reunification will only become harder as time passes. Leaders beyond the island are showing frustration with the island nation's intransigence, as well: UN Special Envoy for the Cyprus situation, Alexander Downer, called the months leading up to Cyprus' rotation into the EU Presidency the “worst three months since [the settlement] process began” (Morelli 9); UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki Moon expressed disappointment “to see a steady stream of... negative remarks,” particularly in the Greek-Cypriot press, regarding the United Nations and its role in the Cyprus negotiations, suggesting that “to undermine UN credibility directly undermine[s] the process itself.” (Chislett)
Debates of land, logistics, and governance are not the only barriers to reunification. Decades of violence may have rendered the two Cypriot communities unable to psychologically consider a partnership, according to one scholar. (Yilmaz 52) Further, generations of Cypriots are growing up with neither a connection to the opposite side of the island and its people nor the desire to forge one with them. (Morelli 21) In the end, a peaceful, formal division into two sovereign states, the Republic of Cyprus and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, may be the best solution to the Cyprus problem.
Infrastructures for separate standing states already exist; the original republic still stands, although it is now under total Greek-Cypriot control, and the splinter state has been functioning under a stable democracy for nearly forty years in a way that the official government had been unable and unwilling to do. The complication arises in how the TRNC wants its sovereignty recognized internationally, whereas the RoC considers the northern region Cypriot land under foreign Turkish occupation. (Morelli 23) Considering the island's history regarding majority-minority relations, as well as Turkey's claim of guarantor over its ethnic kin, the Turkish Cypriots may have a substantial claim for separation. Greek-Cypriot opposition to a united island, in the polls and apparently among the leaders, indicates the majority's ambivalence toward the TRNC's secession. (Oguzlu 78)
Like even the most amicable divorces, however, property and border rights must be managed. Plans and procedures have already been proposed; although such agreements have not been solidified between the Cypriots on these matters, they had been tied to minority representation in a federal government; the elimination of such a condition would give fresh context for talk resumption. 50,000 Turkish Cypriots, and three times as many Greek Cypriots, fled into their respective communal regions after the 1974 invasion, and large plots of land were left unoccupied. (Morelli 18) To settle this dispute without fabricating homelessness or generating ethnic resentment, current tenants should be allowed to remain in their homes and not have to vacate for decades-previous residents. Instead, Cypriots would apply for reparations from the government where their former buildings reside and, when approved, the base reward would be the price of the property, adjusted for inflation; greater rewards would be given on a case-by-case basis. The United Nations has already set aside plans to raise “adequate compensation” (Morelli 18) should such an agreement be reached.
Were both of the nations to solidify into sovereign states, the Green Zone would have to be strengthened as a joint state boundary. While travel through the Zone is not heavily restricted by UN forces, the TRNC and the RoC will have to agree on certain procedures for border-crossing, even if only to agree that the UN's protocol will suffice. Both nations have a national guard at their disposal, although the TRNC's official numbers are unknown, so the states will be obligated to patrol and control the shared border. (CIA) UN peacekeepers would remain for a short period of time to transition full control of the border to the Cypriots, although that time frame will be negotiable between the states. The peacekeepers would be especially concentrated in areas along the border that, in the course of negotiations, may change from one state's control to the other; minor territorial disputes are to be expected, as at least one city has been divided by the current boundary.
Perhaps the most contentious point of discussion will be Turkey's continued presence on the island. The Greek Cypriots have called for the immediate total withdrawal of Turkey's troops, a move that the Turkish Cypriots believe would leave the TRNC vulnerable. A more tenable solution would be for Turkey to roll its forces out of the north at a pace that matches the progress in its negotiations with the European Union; as Turkey gets closer to joining, it takes more troops out of the TRNC. For the Turkish-Cypriots' peace of mind, no fewer than one Turkish soldier per three TRNC soldiers will occupy the northern part of the island until Turkey achieves EU membership. Under the 1960 agreement, however, Turkey will still retain its guarantor status. Perhaps, even as statehood negotiations continue, the TRNC can apply for its own place in the EU; after all, one of the easiest deterrents to war is economic partnership, and if the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus could not be admitted to the EU and its trade union under Cyprus, it could certainly try again as an equal state.
The creation of separate Cypriot states is more than a continuation of the status quo; it would be the affirmation of the Turkish Cypriots' struggles and the cleaning of a diplomatic stain gained in a coup for the Greek Cypriots. It would mean a new beginning for both nations that could perhaps lead to a true, standing peace between them.